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We study negotiations between Telecommunication Networks over access fees, that is, fees one net-
work has to pay to another one, whenever a customer of the former places a phone call to a customer
of the latter. We show that revenue generated from agreed access fees can alleviate the problem of
providing telecommunication services at reasonable prices at rural and other high cost areas. The model
consists of three interconnected networks - two located in the low cost area (urban area) and one located
in the high cost (rural area) - who negotiate pair-wise over access fees. If urban customers place high
value to being able to reach rural customers, then the rural network’s revenue from selling access will
be high enough so that it will become proﬁtable given interconnection, even though it would be making
losses if it were not interconnected with the urban networks. The reason is that access fees allow market
participants to internalize some of the network externalities. The results are robust with respect to the
timing of the moves of the game and, more importantly, with respect to the degree of competition in
the urban market. The lessons apply to other industries that have the network structure, for instance
electricity, postal services and transportation.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper addresses the issue of providing universal service in a deregulated network. Many industries
that have a network structure, for instance gas, electricity, telecommunications and postal services, exhibit
large cost discrepancies. The provision of the ‘same’ service may cost as much as ten times more in some
parts of the network than in others. When this is the case, it is proﬁtable to operate only in some areas. In
most countries, till relatively recently, these industries were either state-owned monopolies or regulated by
the government. Under these ownership structures the government was able to cross-subsidize high-cost
with low-cost, proﬁtable areas.1 Currently the markets for telecommunications services, gas and electricity
in the United States, and in other countries are undergoing major changes. Most of the ﬁrms operating
in these industries have been privatized and regulation is being replaced by competition. As many have
observed, see for instance Baumol (1999), direct cross-subsidies may be incompatible with competition and
deregulation.
The objective of this paper is to demonstrate how indirect cross-subsidizationc a nt a k ep l a c ei nad e r e g -
ulated environment. More speciﬁcally, we would like to identify market conditions that ensure universal
coverage of telecommunication services without government subsidies. Most of the analysis will be based
on the telecommunication industry, but a lot of the insights obtained carry over to other industries as well.
After the introduction of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 by the Congress, the market for local
and long distance service is opened to competition. The major technological breakthroughs in the telecom-
munication and other related industries changed the structure of the telecommunication markets. Due to
these technological advances the distinction between telecommunication and information services, such as
access to the information superhighways, became unclear. This created the need to change the institutions
that govern telecommunication markets in order to avoid creating distortions. According to the previous
arrangement the provision of local telephone services was delivered by local monopolies, the Regional Bell
Operating Companies, (RBOCs), which were subject to regulation. On the other hand, the markets for long
distance services and for internet access were open to competition. The Congress in order to accommodate
the technological advancements passed the Telecommunications Act of 1996 which opened all telecommu-
nication markets to competition. This Act contains a clause that states that advanced telecommunication
and information services must be available to all Americans at reasonable rates. This clause is included
into what the Federal Communication Commission, FCC, refers to as ‘universal service objectives,’ USOs.
The fact that there exist big cost discrepancies in providing telecommunication services in diﬀerent
areas, has lead many to believe that deregulation will threaten universal service objectives. One would
1See Maria Maher (1999) for an empirical study which shows that there are economies of scale in the provision of access
to the local telecommunication network and that costs diﬀer by geographical location.
2expect that no ﬁrm will be willing to provide services in high cost areas, such as remote and sparsely
populated rural areas, whereas competition will prevail in densely populated and more proﬁtable urban
areas. Under the previous arrangement the prices charged by the regulated RBOC reﬂected a cross sub-
sidy from urban to rural markets. This kind of direct c r o s ss u b s i d i z a t i o ni sl i k e l yt ob ei m p o s s i b l ei na
deregulated environment. The Congress realizing this problem asked the FCC to form a Federal-State
Joint Board to specify the services that should be included in the universal service objectives and ways to
ﬁnancially support them, [16]. Similar documents have been prepared by Oftel, [25], in the UK and by the
European Commission, [15], among many others. The major priority of the universal service objectives
is the provision of advanced telecommunication and information services to rural customers at prices that
are comparable to the ones that urban customers pay.
The goal of this research is to show that this objective can be achieved without outside subsidies in
a deregulated2 market of telecommunication services. The reason is positive network externalities. The
value generated from serving a rural customer does not only include his willingness to pay for telephone
service, but also the utility that other customers enjoy from being able to reach him. If urban customers,
residential and businesses, like to place many phone calls in the rural market, then the urban networks
may ﬁnd it proﬁtable to subsidize the rural ones. Providing service to rural customers increases the proﬁts
of a network serving an urban area, since urban customers can place more phone calls. Interconnection
enlarges the market and the beneﬁt of having more customers connected accrues to all parts of the network.
Similar observations hold for other industries, for instance postal services. Delivering a letter to a relative
in a remote area generates surplus to the receiver as well as to the sender.
Our model consists of two diﬀerent markets; a rural or high cost area and an urban or low cost area.
There is only one network operating in the rural market. In the urban market we consider three alternative
scenarios. First we look at the case there is only one urban network, (monopoly), and then we consider the
case of a competitive urban market, and ﬁnally the more realistic case, where there are two horizontally
diﬀerentiated urban networks. We assume that networks choose their prices non-cooperatively and they
bargain pairwise over the level of access fees. The outcome of negotiations is determined by the Nash-
Bargaining solution. We demonstrate that interconnection is a feature of the market that may support
universal service, even in a deregulated market.3 How? The rural network generates revenue by selling
services to rural customers AND by selling access to its facilities to the urban networks. Urban networks
pay an access fee to the rural network each time an urban customer places a call to a rural customer (and
the opposite). Under certain conditions net access revenue of a rural network can lead to positive proﬁts,
even if this network would make losses if it were isolated (that is, in the case that there were no calls made
2For an excellent survey of the enormous literature on regulation see Armstrong and Sappington (2004).
3‘Interconnection’ means that customers of one network can reach customers of the other network.
3between urban and rural customers).
When we examine the case of horizontally diﬀerentiated urban networks, our model builds on Armstrong
(1998), Carter and Wright (1999), and Laﬀont, Rey and Tirole (1998a). These papers study, among others,
competition between telecommunication networks in a deregulated or partially regulated environment.
Their focus is on the determination of the price of telecommunications services and of the access fees that
each network pays to competing networks, when a customer of the former places a call to a customer
of the latter. We extend the basic model by studying the determination of access fees and prices in an
environment that consists of three interconnected networks. There is two-way access between all networks
and competition for customers between the networks located in the urban area. This model has the
advantage that it builds upon the standard network-interconnection model - which makes our analysis
directly comparable to the existing ones; the downside is that it does not allow for tractable analytical
results. We calculate the equilibrium prices and access fees in a parametrized example and show that in
many instances, even though the rural network would be making losses if it were not interconnected with
the urban networks, it will become proﬁtable if there is interconnection. The urban network subsidizes
the rural network in the following way: whenever a rural customer places a call to an urban customer the
urban network charges a negative access fee to the rural network. This result is robust to diﬀerent sequence
of moves of the game.
Our results demonstrate that if urban customers place a large enough fraction of their total demand for
calls to rural customers, then the rural network generates revenue from selling access that is high enough
to cover its losses from providing telecommunication services. If this is the case in some markets, then
there is no need to arrange for outside subsidies, since the market is viable on its own. One would think
that such an insight that is based on ‘voluntary’ cross subsidization, between the urban and the rural
market, would be vulnerable to the degree of competition in the urban market, the argument being that
competition erodes proﬁts, and there is nothing left for ‘cross-subsidization.’ Our results suggest that this
is not true at least in the case where there is only one network serving the rural area, (which given large
ﬁxed costs is probably the scenario that is most likely). Actually it is exactly the opposite. The monopoly
power of the rural network vis-a-vis urban networks that oﬀer indistinguishable services, and hence have no
market power, makes it a very tough negotiator. When the rural network bargains with an urban network
over access fees, the rural network knows that if they fail to reach agreement, the urban network will suﬀer
a severe loss in market share, (in the extreme case we solved analytically it will be actually kicked out of
the market). The reason being that no urban customer would like to pay the same price for telephone
service and not being able to complete phone calls across markets, when he/she can buy service from some
other network that has interconnection with the rural market. On the other hand, the rural network does
not loose anything in the event that it fails to reach agreement with a particular urban network, since it
4can still connect with the other urban networks who now serve all the market. This mechanism, that is
the eﬀect of interconnection agreements on market shares, is also present in the case that urban networks
have some market power, but is less extreme. In those cases though there is diﬀerent channel for potential
allowing suﬃcient subsidizations: the higher the market power the higher the proﬁts of urban networks.
But higher market power also means higher bargaining power vis-a-vis the rural network, that is higher
market power in the urban market implies higher proﬁts but also stronger bargaining position, whereas
low market power implies very low proﬁts in the urban market but at the same time, very weak position in
the negotiations. In other words depending on the market power in the urban market there are diﬀerent
mechanisms in place that work in favor of cross-subsidization. A weakness of the current analysis is that
our results are completely silent to whether prices will be comparable across markets. In the future we
plan to investigate the eﬀect of cross-market price constraints, similar to the ones in [1], on the negotiated
access fees and on the equilibrium proﬁts.
There has been some recent theoretical work that studies universal service objectives issues but with
diﬀerent focus then the current project. Anton, Weide and Vettas (2002) develop a multi-market model
that consists of an oligopolistic urban market, entry auctions for rural service and cross market price
restrictions. They analyze how these restrictions aﬀect pricing in the urban market and entry decisions
in the rural market. The assumed market structure does not consist of networks so there is no other
interconnection between the rural and the urban market. Laﬀont and Tirole (2000) in Chapter 6 discuss
Universal Service Obligations. They oﬀer some institutional background and analyze ways to generate the
“right subsidies” by means of designing auction mechanisms that determine, among, others the structure of
the market, (auction mechanisms with endogenous market structure). Milgrom (1996) is the ﬁrst to discuss
the application of mechanisms with endogenous market structure, developed by Dana and Spier (1994),
in Universal Service Obligations.4 Compared to the previous work, our focus is not how to generate the
right subsidies for USOs, but to demonstrate that outside intervention and subsidies may not be necessary.
Baumol (1999) and Armstrong (2001a), like this paper, are concerned with the issue of how competition
will aﬀect USO’s. Both consider the stage of transition to competition, where there is an incumbent
network who faces potential entrants that may or may not bypass its facilities. The incumbent does not
need to buy access to the entrant’s facilities. The focus of those papers is to determine the access fees
paid to the incumbent by the entrant that generate eﬃcient entry, and when bypass is possible, eﬃcient
make-or-buy decisions for the entrant. Here we examine the case of mature competition where all networks
need to purchase necessary inputs from each other. The papers by Riordan (2000) and (2001) investigate
the economic rational for USO’s. In this paper we do not aim at exploring whether USO’s is indeed an
4See also Weller (1998).
5appropriate objective, but we show that it can be achieved even in a deregulated environment.
2U n i t D e m a n d s
2.1 Monopoly in the Urban Market
2.1.1 The model
We will start by examining a very simple scenario. We consider a situation where there are two telecom-
munication networks, A and R.N e t w o r k A operates in the low cost area (or urban area) . Network R
is located in the high cost area, the rural area. When a subscriber of A calls a subscriber of R, A has
to ‘buy’ access to R’s subscribers. In short, network i sells access to network j and the opposite. Hence
there is ‘two-way’ access without competition between network R and network i = A,B. In order for urban
customers to be able to terminate a call in the rural market, and the reverse, the urban and the rural
network must sign an interconnection agreement.
• Demand Structure in the Urban Market
We assume that
• consumers derive utility only from placing and not from receiving phone calls.
The utility of an urban consumer connected to network A is given by
U(pA)=v − pA.
In the rural market there is a single network called R. The net surplus for a rural customer from being
connected to the network is given by
U(pR)=v − pR.
We consider the case where demand for phone calls in both markets is ﬁxed and equal to one. A rural
customer places a fraction rR of the total calls within the rural market and a fraction (1−rR) to the urban
market. Similarly, an urban customer places a fraction rU of the total calls within the urban market and a
fraction (1−rU) to the rural market. A result of this assumption is that the demand of network A depends
on whether it has signed an interconnection agreement with R.
In the case that A signs interconnection agreements with R, its demand is given by
dA(pA)=
(
1 if v − pA ≥ 0
0 otherwise
,
6where pA stands for the price charged by A in case it has signed an interconnection agreement with R. In










A denotes the price charged by A in case it fails to sign an interconnection agreement with R.
Similarly, in case of agreement with A, the demand for the rural network is given by
dR(pR)=
(
γ if v − pR ≥ 0
0 otherwise
,
where γ ∈ [0,1] and pR stands for the price that the rural network charges in case of agreement with A.
Let pD
R denote the price charged by the rural network in case of disagreement with A. In this event, the









• Cost Structure and Proﬁts
N o ww es p e c i f yt h ec o s ts t r u c t u r eo ft h en e t w o r k s .L e t 5 co
i denote the cost of originating a phone call
from network i, and cT
i the cost of terminating a phone call at network i, i = A,R. Network i incurs a
ﬁxed cost cF
i of servicing a customer.
We use pi to denote the price set by network i and tAR , (tRA), to denote the access fee that the rural
network R,(A), pays to network A, (R), each time a subscriber of network R, (A), calls a subscriber of
network A, (R).
Remark: We will argue in a minute that networks will not charge diﬀerent prices for phone calls completed
within the network and phone calls completed across networks.
Given this observation network A0s and R0s proﬁts are given by
ΠA = pA − c0
A − rUcT
A − (1 − rR)cT
A − (1 − rU)tRA +( 1− rR)γtAR − cF
A
ΠR = γ(pR − c0
R) − rRγcT
R − (1 − rU)cT

















5The cost structure is similar to the one in Armstrong (1998).























The ﬁrst term in the above expression is ﬁrm A0s proﬁt in the retail sector and the second term is the
ﬁrm’s proﬁt from buying or selling access in the rural market. The proﬁts of the network serving the rural
























Assumption 1:W ew i l la s s u m et h a tv>c T
R and that v>c T
A, that is the value of a call to consumers is
greater than the cost of terminating a call of both networks. Moreover we will assume that the rural
network’s termination cost is as least as large as the one of the urban network, that is cT
R ≥ cT
A.
Assumption 2:W es e tco
A = co
R = cF
A =0 . This normalization is done for expositional simplicity.
2.1.2 Determination of Prices and Access fees
We study the equilibrium choices of prices and access fees, in a sequential move game where networks ﬁrst
negotiate over access fees and then set their prices non-cooperatively.
Stage 1:N e t w o r k sA and R negotiate over access fees (tRA,t AR).
Stage 2:N e t w o r kj sets its price pj,j= A,R.
We are looking for a subgame perfect equilibrium, so we will start solving the game backwards.
Stage 2: Setting Prices
Since A and R are local monopolists and consumers have inelastic demand, they will extract all the
surplus from consumers. The same would be true even if networks were allowed to price discriminate based
on where the phone call would be terminated.
Lemma 1 The prices set by A and R in case of agreement and in case of disagreement are given by
pA = v = pD
A
pR = v = pD
R.
8Proof: A and R face no competition. In this unit demand model the networks in both markets set a
price that extracts all consumer surplus, that is
pA = v = pD
A
pR = v = pD
R,
where pj,j= A,R is network j0s p r i c ei nc a s eo fa g r e e m e n ta n dpD
j is j0s price in case of disagreement.
Stage 1: Negotiations
We examine the determination of access fees through free negotiations without regulation. Networks will
be assumed to negotiate pairwise over access fees. The outcome of negotiations is determined by the Nash
Bargaining Solution. The US Telecommunication Act of 1996 states that access fees should be negotiated
among networks subject to regulatory approval. In Europe interconnection agreements should be negotiated
within the framework of the European Law and the supervision of the National Regulatory Agencies. In
other countries, for instance in New Zealand, after the privatization of the national telecommunication
provider, there is no regulatory agency and networks should reach interconnection agreements that do not
violate the existing antitrust laws.
The Nash Bargaining solution is a cooperative solution concept, that allows for a parsimonious repre-
sentation of the conﬂicts of interests in a given negotiation. According to the Nash Bargaining Solution,
negotiating parties split the ‘gains from reaching an agreement’, equally among each other. For a discussion
of the application of the Nash Bargaining Solution to various bargaining problems and its relationship with
non-cooperative dynamic solution concepts see Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986).
The access fees should solve:
(tAR,t RA) ∈ argmax(ΠA − ΠD
A)(ΠR − ΠD
R). (1)
The payoﬀs that accrue to A and R respectively in case of agreement are given by
ΠA =( v − cT
A) − RAR − [γ(1 − rR) − (1 − rU)]cT
A
and
ΠR = γ(v − cT
R) − cF
R + RAR +[ γ(1 − rR) − (1 − rU)]cT
R
where
RAR =( 1− rU)tRA − (1 − rR)tARγ.
9In case the networks fail to reach an interconnection agreement their payoﬀsa r eg i v e nb yw h e r e
ΠD
A = rU(v − cT
A)
ΠD
R = γrR(v − cT
R) − cF
R. (2)
The ﬁrst order conditions of (1) reduce to
ΠA − ΠD
A = ΠR − ΠD
R,
from which we can obtain the following:
Proposition 1 The rural network’s net access revenue from interconnection is given by
RAR =0 .5
£





















((1 − rU) − (1 − rR)γ)v + cT
R((1 − rU) − γ(1 − rR))
¤
=0 .5((1 − rU) − (1 − rR)γ)(v + cT
R),
where the last line is non-negative so long as (1 − rU) > (1 − rR)γ.
Proposition 3 The equilibrium proﬁts of the networks are given by
ΠR =0 .5γ(1 + rR)(v − cT
R)+0 .5(1 − rU)(v − cT
A) − cF
R




ΠA =0 .5(1 + rU)(v − cT
A)+0 .5γ(1 − rR)(v − cT
R)




10Remark 1 The rural network’s equilibrium proﬁts will be non-negative provided that
0.5(γ(1 + rR)+( 1− rU))v
≥ cF
R + cT
R (γrR +0 .5(1 − rU)) + 0.5γ(1 − rR)cT
A
Remark 2 Both networks beneﬁt from interconnection. From (2) and (3), (4) we obtain that
ΠR − ΠD
R =0 .5γ(1 − rR)(v − cT
A)+0 .5(1 − rU)(v − cT
R) ≥ 0. (5)
For network A one can obtain
ΠA − ΠD
A =0 .5(1 − rU)(v − cT
A)+0 .5(1 − rU)(v − cT
R) ≥ 0. (6)
From (5) and (6 we see that both networks beneﬁt from interconnection.
We proceed to examine the eﬀect of parameters on the equilibrium proﬁts of the networks.
Proposition 4 The equilibrium proﬁt so ft h er u r a ln e t w o r ka r e ( i )d e c r e a s i n gi nrU and (ii) increasing in
rR if 0.5v+0.5cT
A ≥ cT
R. The urban network´s equilibrium proﬁts are (i) increasing in rU and (ii) decreasing
in rR.
Proof. Partially diﬀerentiating with respect to the corresponding parameters we obtain
∂ΠR
∂rU
= −v0.5 − 0.5cT




=0 .5vγ − cT
Rγ +0 .5cT
Aγ ≥ 0






=0 .5v +0 .5cT
R − cT





= −0.5γv +0 .5γcT
A < 0, since v>c T
A.
The proﬁts of the rural network are decreasing in rU, where rU stands for the fraction of urban phone
calls completed within the urban market. Also ΠR are increasing in rR so long as the termination costs
11in the rural network, cT















Contrary to the rural network, the urban network’s proﬁts are increasing in rU and decreasing in rR. We
will later establish that the qualitative results obtained in this very simple model match the ones we will
obtain when we study via simulations a more elaborate model that was based on the standard 2 - way
network interconnection model.
In this section we looked at a polar case where the urban network is a monopolist in the market. In
order to see whether the obtained results are robust to other market structures, we examine ﬁrst the case
of a competitive urban market and then the case where networks have some market power.
2.2 Competitive Urban Market
2.2.1 The Model
We examine the scenario where two networks operating in the urban market, call them A and B oﬀer
indistinguishable services. Consumers have inelastic demand for phone calls. We normalize the number of
phone calls demanded by consumers in the urban market to one. A fraction rU of these calls are completed
within the urban market and a fraction (1 − rU) are directed to the rural market.
Assumption: Balanced calling pattern: Ac u s t o m e ro fA calls with equal probability a subscriber of
A and a subscriber of B.
Let s denote A0s market share in the urban market. Networks A and B charge diﬀerent prices for calls
terminating in diﬀerent networks. We use pi to denote the price charged by i for calls completed within i;
p
j
i stands for the price charged by i for the calls completed in network j.
Consumer Preferences and Demand
In the urban market consumers may subscribe to just one network. We assume that rU is the fraction
of total phone calls completed within the urban market and (1−rU) is the percentage of total phone calls




i ,m)=srU(v − pi)+( 1− s)rU(v − p
j
i)+s(1 − rU)(v − pR
i )+m, i,j ∈ {A,B}
where m represents the consumption of other goods. Note that in this model 1 denotes the aggregate
quantity of phone calls that the average subscriber of network i plans to make. Some of these phone calls
are completed within the urban market , whereas some are made to customers in the rural market.
12In the rural market there is a single network called R and a measure γ ∈ [0,1] of identical consumers..
Again demand for phone calls of a representative consumer is ﬁxed and equal to one. We assume that a
rural customer places a fraction rR of the total calls within the rural market and a fraction (1−rR) to the
urban market. The net surplus for a rural customer from being connected to the network is given by
ψR(pR,m)=γrR (v − pR)+γ(1 − rR)s(v − pA
R)+γ(1 − rR)(1 − s)(v − pA
R).
Note that the rural network faces no competition, hence will charge a price equal to v no matter where
the phone call is terminated, that is there will be no price discrimination based on where a phone call is
terminated. A consumer places a phone call only if v ≥ p, where p is the price of some phone call.
Demand for phone calls hence depends as usual on price and also on the interconnection agreements.
For instance in the case that A signs interconnection agreements with all networks its demand is given by
dA(pA)=1if v − pA ≥ 0;v − pR
A ≥ 0 and v − pB
A ≥ 0 ,
In case of disagreement with R demand is given by
dDAR
A (pDAR
A )=ru if v − pD
A ≥ 0;v − pR
A ≥ 0 and v − pB
A ≥ 0,
a n ds of o r t h .I na na n a l o g o u sw a yw ec a nﬁnd the demand for all possible ranges of prices and all possible
interconnection scenaria, for all urban networks as well as for network R. For instance in case of agreement
with A, and B the demand for the rural network is given by
dR(pR)=γ if v − pR ≥ 0;v − pA
R ≥ 0 and v − pB
R ≥ 0,
Cost Structure and Proﬁts
The cost structure is the same as in the previous scenario, that is a network i, i = A,B,R, incurs a
cost co
i of originating a phone call, a cost cT
i of terminating a phone call and a ﬁxed cost cF
i . The proﬁts of
A and B are given by







A − tRA) − cF
A +
s(1 − s)ru(tA − cT
A)+s(1 − rR)γ(tAR − cT
A)





+(1 − s)(1 − ru)(pR
B − cT
B − tRB) − cF
B +
s(1 − s)ru(tB − cT
B)+( 1− s)(1 − rR)γ(tBR − cT
B)
13where s stands for A0s market share and (1 − s) stands for B0s market share. In this model where the
urban networks oﬀer indistinguishable services, the market shares are taken to be exogenous. This is a
relatively standard assumption, see for instance Laﬀont et.al. (2001). The proﬁts of the rural network are
given by
ΠR = γ(pR − cT
R)+s(1 − rU)(tRA − cT
R) − s(1 − rR)γ(tAR − cT
R)
+(1 − s)(1 − rU)(tRB − cT
R) − (1 − s)(1 − rR)γ(tBR − cT
R) − cF
R.
Suppose that the urban networks are identical, i.e. cO
A = cO
B > 0, cT
A = cT
B > 0 and cF
A = cF
B =0 , (that is
no ﬁxed costs). We will examine symmetric equilibria, where




B,t A = tB and
tAR = tBR,t RA = tRB.
A sb e f o r e ,w ew i l la s s u m et h a tv>c T




2.2.2 Determination of Prices and Access fees.
Stage 1: Networks negotiate over access fees.
Stage 2: Given the outcome of negotiations, networks choose their prices.
We assume that ﬁrst the networks negotiate pairwise over access fees and given these access fees,
choose their prices non-cooperatively. We use the Nash-Bargaining solution to determine the outcome of
the negotiations between two networks. Negotiations between two networks take place simultaneously and
independently of all other negotiations. When two networks negotiate with each other, their disagreement
payoﬀs are determined assuming that all other negotiatins have been terminated successfully.
Stage 2:
Price competition in urban market drives prices to marginal cost.
Proposition 5 There exist a symmetric equilibrium where the urban networks set the price of calls equal










The pricing behavior of B is analogous.
14Proof. The result follows using the standard arguments of Bertrand competition.
The rural network is a monopolist so its sets
pR = vR = pD
R.
Substituting the equilibrium prices in the expressions of proﬁts we would get
ΠA =
s(1 − s)ru(tA − cT
A)
| {z }
net access revenue from the urban market
+
s(1 − rR)γ(tAR − cT
A)
| {z }
net access revenue from the rural market
ΠB =
s(1 − s)ru(tB − cT
B)
| {z }
net access revenue from the urban market
+
(1 − s)(1 − rR)γ(tBR − cT
B)
| {z }
net access revenue from the rural market
and the proﬁts of the rural network are given by:
ΠR = γ(vR − cT
R − c0
R)+s(1 − rU)(tRA − cT
R) − s(1 − rR)γ(tAR − cT
R)
+(1 − s)(1 − rU)(tRB − cT




Now we study negotiations over access fees between the urban networks A and B and between an urban
network and the rural network.
Negotiations between A and B :
The payoﬀs that accrue to these networks in case of agreement are given by
ΠA = s(1 − s)ru(tA − cT
A)+s(1 − rR)γ(tAR − cT
A)
ΠB = s(1 − s)ru(tB − cT
B)+( 1− s)(1 − rR)γ(tBR − cT
B)
and in case of disagreement- (since we are looking at a symmetric equilibrium we will assume that the
market shares of the urban networks do not change in the event that they fail to sign an interconnection
agreement.)
ΠDAB
A = s(1 − rR)γ(tAR − cT
A)
ΠDAB
B =( 1 − s)(1 − rR)γ(tBR − cT
B)
t ∈ argmax(ΠA − ΠDAR
A )(ΠB − ΠDAB
B )
t ∈ argmax[s(1 − s)ru(t − cT
A)][s(1 − s)ru(t − cT
B)]
15Proposition 6 At a symmetric equilibrium the reciprocal access fee chosen by the urban networks is given
by
t = v − co (7)
Proof. Since networks are symmetric, that is cT
A = cT
B = cT; co
A = co
B = co; and because s(1 − s)rU is a
constant, the problem simplifes to:
t ∈ argmax(t − cT)2
This is maximized clearly by setting t equal to its largest possible value which is the one such that
v − t − c0 ≥ 0
hence
t = v − co.
Negotiations between A and R :
(tAR,t RA) ∈ argmax(ΠA − ΠDAR
A )(ΠR − ΠDAR
R )
The ﬁrst order condition of the Nash-Bargaining solution is given by
ΠA − ΠDAR
A = ΠR − ΠDAR
R . (8)
In order to specify ΠDAR
A we need to ﬁnd what the market share of A will be in the urban market in the
case it disagrees with R. This is done in the Proposition that follows.
Proposition 7 In the event that A fails to sign an interconnection agreement with R, then B will capture
all the market.
Proof. To see this note that the beneﬁt that accrues to a customer from being connected with A in the
case it fails to sign an interconnection agreement with R is given by
uA = rUs(v − pA)+rU(1 − s)(v − pB
A);
16on the other hand the utility of a consumer connected to B is given by
uB = rU(1 − s)(v − pB)+rUs(v − pA
B)+( 1− rU)(v − pR
B)
perfect comeptition for rural phonecalls leads to an equilibrium where pA = pB and pB
A = pA
B. Now if pR
B is
even ε below v all consumers prefer to be connected to network B.
Hence if A fails to sign an interconnection agreement with R it looses all its market share and its
disagreement payoﬀ is given by ΠDAR
A =0 . From the previous proposition it also follows that in case the





A = s(1 − s)ru(tA − cT




From the FOC of the Nash-Bargaining solution we get that
s(1 − s)ru(tA − cT
A)+s(1 − rR)γ(tAR − cT
A)=0
which gives us that





s(1 − s)ru(tA − cT
A)
s(1 − rR)γ
and by substituting tA, given by (7), we obtain
tAR = cT
A −
s(1 − s)ru(v − co − cT
A)
s(1 − rR)γ
Observe that in this environment one cannot determine tAR and tRA both simultaneously. We parametrize
the solution by tRA. There is actually an indeterminacy in the level of tRA the highest possible value is
tRA = v − co.
Since we are looking at a symmetric equilibrium, this must also be the outcome of negotiations between
network B and network R. The proposition that follows summarizes the ﬁndings.
17Proposition 8 At a symmetric equilibrium, the access fee that the rural network pays to an urban network
is given by
tAR = tBR = cT −
s(1 − s)rU(v − co − cT
A)
s(1 − rR)γ
and the access fee that the urban network pays to an rural network is given by
tRA = tRB = v − co.
It is worth observing that the access fee that the rural network pays to an urban network in below the
cost of terminating the call. On the other hand the access fee that an urban network pays to the rural
network is equal to the value of the phone call minus the cost of originating the call. That is, via the
access fee the rural network can extract all the surplus - net of originating cost - that is generated from
interconnection. The reason for this is the extremely strong bargaining power that it has. This power
comes from the fact that R is the monopolist in selling access to rural customers. This together with the
ﬁerce competition that the urban networks face, allows R to achieve extremely favorable interconnection
agreements.
Proposition 9 At a symmetric equilibrium, the proﬁts of the networks are give by
ΠR = γ(vR − cT
R − c0
R)+( 1− rU)(v − co − cT






ΠB = ΠA =0 .
Moreover the rural network’s proﬁts are greater compared to the ones without interconnection.
Proof. Hence the rural network’s equilibrium proﬁts are given by
ΠR = γ(vR − cT
R − c0
R)+( 1− rU)(v − co − cT
R) − (1 − rR)γ
µ
cT −








= γ(vR − cT
R − c0
R)+( 1− rU)(v − co − cT
R)+( 1− rR)γ
µ








= γ(vR − cT
R − c0
R)+( 1− rU)(v − co − cT






It is easy to see that the rural network’s proﬁts without interconnection are
ΠNI






R =( 1 − rU)(v − co − cT
R)+( 1− rR)γ
µ







since v>c o + cT
R and cT
R >c T.
18Which is strictly greater than the rural network’s proﬁts with interconnection. Now the payoﬀs that accrue
to an urban network are given by
Π = ΠA = ΠB = −cF + s(1 − s)ru(v − co − cT)+s(1 − rR)γ
µ
cT −





= s(1 − s)ru(v − co − cT) −
¡




Proposition 10 The rural network’s equilibrium proﬁts are decreasing in rR and in rU.
Proof. Recall that
ΠR = γ(vR − cT
R − c0
R)+( 1− rU)(v − co − cT









= −(v − co − cT
R)+s(1 − s)(v − co − cT)









The results in this section demonstrate that even the ﬁercer form of competition does not eliminate
the possibility of cross-subsidization across markets. But in order to obtain a yet more complete picture of
the mechanisms we will later examine the, maybe, more realistic case where networks have some market
power in variable demand model.
3 The Variable Demand Model
3.1 Monopoly in the Urban Market
Here we will expand our analysis to allow for elastic demand. This modeling will also allow for non-trivial
analysis of the socially optimal level of prices and access fees.
Demand Structure in the Urban Market
Suppose that the utility from consuming telecommunication services by a representative consumer is
u(q)=( aU − 0.5q)q + m.
19As usual, given income I, a consumer seeks to maximize her utility subject to the budget constraint
piqi + m ≤ I.
Suppose that a consumer has joined network i, then given price pi, the quantity that maximizes her utility
is given by
q(pi)=aU − pi,





There a measure one of such consumers, so aggregate demand is given by
q(pi)=aU − p.
Demand Structure in the Rural Market
In the rural market the local network faces a measure γ ∈ [0,1] of identical consumers. We assume
that the aggregate demand function is given by
qR(pR)=γ(aR − pR).
Cost Structure and Proﬁts
This is all exactly as in the unit demand model, with the diﬀerence that q is now a function of price.
















then A0s proﬁts can be rewritten as













































We would like to investigate what prices and access fees maximize welfare subject to the constraint that
none of the networks, that is the urban and the rural network, is running a loss. Let λ1 and λ2 denote the
Lagrangian multipliers associated with these constraints. Welfare is given by
W =
(aU − pA)2
2 | {z }
consumer surplus in urban market
+
γ(aR − pR)2
2 | {z }







































producer surplus in rural market
∂W
∂pU
= −(aU − pA)+( 1+λU)
¡
















































































γ(aR − pR) − γpR + γco
R + γcT
R − cF








































− (1 + 2λR)pR
pR =


















Now let us look for the welfare maximizing access fees.
∂W
∂tAR
=( 1 + λU)((1− rR)γ(aR − pR)) − (1 + λR)((1− rR)γ(aR − pR))
∂W
∂tRA




> 0 then tAR as large as possible
∂W
∂tAR
< 0 then tAR as small as possible
3.2 Horizontal Diﬀerentiation in the Urban Market: The Case of Variable Demand
We consider three telecommunication networks, A, B and R.N e t w o r k s A and B operate in the same
geographic area, the low cost area (or urban area) and are competing for subscribers. Networks A and
B are horizontally diﬀerentiated and each can provide full coverage of the urban market. Consumers are
uniformly located on the segment [0,1] and each network is located at the ends of this line, xA =0and
xB =1 . Network R is located in the high cost area, the rural area, and is not competing for customers
with networks A and B. When all networks are interconnected, then a customer of a network i can place
a phone call to a customer of network j, where i,j = A,B,R.
This is a model that captures the state of mature competition of the industry. There are a number of
interconnected networks where some compete directly for customers and others not, but all ﬁrms need to
purchase necessary inputs from each other. Each consumer can subscribe to one network only. When a
subscriber of B calls a subscriber of A, B has to ‘buy’ access to A’s subscribers. In short, network i sells
access to network j and the opposite. Hence there is ‘two-way’ access with competition between network
A and network B and ‘two-way’ access without competition between network R and network i = A,B.
• Demand Structure in the Urban Market6
In the urban market networks A and B compete for customers. An individual’s utility from being a
subscriber to network i depends on the degree of interconnection of network i with other networks, Si, the
price per phone call, pi, and the other extra features network i oﬀers, βi.
We assume that
• consumers derive utility only from placing and not from receiving phone calls
• Balanced calling pattern. Within the urban market a consumer calls with equal probability a con-
sumer in the same network and one belonging to a diﬀerent network.7
6The demand structure resembles the one in Carter and Wright (1999). The analysis in Economides, Lopomo and Wright
(1996) provides a justiﬁcation for it.
7For further discussion on the balanced calling pattern see Laﬀont et al. 1998a.
22• no price discrimination between phone calls completed within a network, and phone calls across
networks.
We follow Carter and Wright (1999) in the speciﬁcation of consumer preferences. We assume that
consumers have additively separable preferences between phone calls and extra features (the latter is
where the networks diﬀer). To an individual the value of being interconnected to a network depends on
the fraction of consumers that she can reach by joining it, that is, on the size of the network she joins, Si.
An urban network’s size, Si,i= A,B depends on the interconnection agreements it has signed with the
other networks, and on its market share (which depends on its price and its rivals price). We will later
calculate the size of each network under various interconnection scenarios.
We assume that marginal utility is linear in the total quantity of phone calls, more speciﬁcally
u(q)=( a − 0.5q)q,
Note that in this model qi denotes the aggregate quantity of phone calls that the average subscriber of
network i plans to make. Some of these phone calls are completed within the urban market , Qi
U, whereas
s o m ea r em a d et oc u s t o m e r si nt h er u r a lm a r k e t ,Qi
R, that is qi = Qi
R + Qi
U. We assume that Qi
U = rUqi
and Qi
R =( 1− rU)qi, where rU denotes the percentage of total phone calls that are completed within the
urban market.8
As usual, given income I, a consumer seeks to maximize her utility subject to the budget constraint
piqi + m ≤ I.
Suppose that a consumer has joined network i, then given price pi, the quantity that maximizes her utility
is given by
q(pi)=a − pi,
and her indirect utility
ψ(pi,S i,βi,I)=v(pi)Si + βi + m






where QR denotes the calls within the urban market and QU t h eo n e sd i r e c t e dt ot h er u r a lm a r k e t , a n dPU = PR, and I
denotes the income of a representative consumer, then demands are
QU = rUQ
QR =( 1 − rU)Q,
where Q =
I






m represents the consumption of other goods, βi stands for the extras associated with being connected to
network i, and Si is the degree of interconnection of network i, i = A,B.
• Demand Structure in the Rural Market
In the rural market the local network faces a unit measure of identical consumers.9 Since there is only
one network in the rural market, we will not model explicitly the utility that an individual enjoys by being
connected to the network. We will focus on the aggregate demand function, which we will assume for
simplicity that it is given by
qR(pR)=γ(a − pR),
where γ ∈ [0,1] and qR(pR) denotes the aggregate quantity of phone calls that the average subscriber of
the rural network plans to make at price pR. The total quantity of phone calls equals the sum of calls
directed to urban customers, QR
U, and calls directed to rural consumers, QR




U =( 1−rR)qR and QR
R = rRqR, where rR is the fraction of total calls made by the average
rural customer that are completed within the rural market.
We now determine the size of network i, Si under diﬀerent degrees of interconnection.
• Size of the networks
Table (1) contains the size of a network for diﬀerent cases of interconnection agreements taking the
market shares of A and B as given. We use s to denote A0s market share in case all networks have signed
interconnection agreements, s1 is A0s share when negotiations between A and B fail, s2 is A0s market share
when negotiations between A and R fail, and ﬁnally s3 is A0s share when negotiations between B and R
fail. If A has signed interconnection agreements with B and R, then SA =1 , and a subscriber of network
A can reach a subscriber j irrespective of the network that j belongs. If it has signed an interconnection
agreement only with B then SA = rU, (the rural customers cannot be reached by a subscriber of A), and
ﬁnally if it has signed an interconnection agreement with R only, SA = rUs +( 1− rU), where s denotes
A0s market share.
• Market shares when the urban networks are interconnected to each other: SA = SB =1 .
9Or alternatively, one representative consumer.
24Table 1: The Size of Networks
Size of A Size of B Size of R




= rUs1 +( 1− rU)
SDAB
B














rR +( 1− rR)s3
,
Now we determine the market share of an urban network for various degrees of interconnection with the
other networks. If all networks are interconnected, that is Si =1 ,f o ri = A,B,R, ac o n s u m e r ’ sd e c i s i o n
on which network to join, depends on pA,p B and βA and βB. For a consumer located at x, βA =( 1−x)α
and βB = xα. To be more speciﬁc, if
ψ(pA,S A,βA,I) ≥ ψ(pB,S B,βB,I) or
v(pA)+( 1− x)α + m ≥ v(pB)+xα + m
then the consumer located at x will subscribe to network A. With interconnection, the market share of





















2α , which will be used in later derivations.
• Market shares when A and B are not interconnected: SA =( rUs1 +( 1− rU)) and SB =
(rU(1 − s1)+( 1− rU))
In the case that the urban networks are not interconnected, the net surplus for a consumer located at
x, from being connected to network A, when A and B failed to sign an interconnection agreement is given
25by
v(pA)(rUs1 +( 1− rU)) + (1 − x)α,
and the net surplus from being connected to network B is given by
v(pB)(rU(1 − s1)+( 1− rU)) + αx,
where s1 stands for network A0s market share, for the case that urban ﬁrms fail to reach an agreement,
and pi denotes the price of network i, i = A,B. With no interconnection between A and B, network A0s





0 if x1 < 0





α − v(pB)+v(pA)(1 − rU)
2α − (v(pA)+v(pB))rU
. (11)






• Market shares when A and R are not interconnected: SA = rU and SB =1
When A and R fail to sign an interconnection agreement, the net surplus for a consumer located at x,
is given by
v(pA)rU +( 1− x)α + m,
and the net surplus from being connected to network B is given by
v(pB)+αx + m.





0 if x2 < 0











Network B0s market share is given by 1 − s2.
26• Market shares when B and R are not interconnected: SA =1and SB = rU
Using the, by now familiar, procedure, we get that with no interconnection between B and R, network





0 if x3 < 0










Network B0s market share is given by 1 − s3.
• Cost Structure and Proﬁts
Now we specify the cost structure of the networks. Let10 co
i denote the cost of originating a phone call
from network i, and cT
i the cost of terminating a phone call at network i, i = A,B,R. Network i incurs a
ﬁxed cost cF
i of servicing a customer. Also let s ∈ [0,1] denote network A0s market share and 1 − s, B0s
market share. That is, we implicitly assume that consumer preferences are such that all of them wish to
purchase telecommunication services.
We use pi to denote the price set by network i and ti to designate the access fee network j pays to
network i, each time a subscriber of network j calls a subscriber of network i = A,B and j = A,B, i 6= j.
We also use tiR , (tRi), to denote the access fee that the rural network R,(i), pays to network i, (R), each
time a subscriber of network R, (i), calls a subscriber of network i, (R), where i = A,B. Networks do
not charge diﬀerent prices for phone calls completed within the network and phone calls completed across











s(1 − s)ru(tA − cT



















then A0s proﬁts can be rewritten as




























10The cost structure is similar to the one in Armstrong (1998).
27The ﬁrst term in the above expression is ﬁrm A0s proﬁt in the retail sector; the second term is the ﬁrm’s
proﬁt from buying or selling access in the urban market; and the third term is the ﬁrm’s proﬁt from buying
or selling access in the rural market. Similarly the proﬁts of network B are given by



























































Determination of Prices and Access fees
There are three players in this game: two urban networks denoted by A and B and a rural network, R.
We look at a scenario where networks negotiate over interconnection agreements and choose their prices
non-cooperatively. The US Telecommunication Act of 1996 states that access fees should be negotiated
among networks subject to regulatory approval. In Europe interconnection agreements should be negotiated
within the framework of the European Law and the supervision of the National Regulatory Agencies. In
other countries, for instance in New Zealand, after the privatization of the national telecommunication
provider, there is no regulatory agency and networks should reach interconnection agreements that do not
violate the existing antitrust laws. We examine the determination of access fees through free negotiations
without regulation. Networks will be assumed to negotiate pairwise over access fees. The outcome of
negotiations is determined by the Nash Bargaining Solution.
The Nash Bargaining solution is a cooperative solution concept, that allows for a parsimonious repre-
sentation of the conﬂicts of interests in a given negotiation. According to the Nash Bargaining Solution,
negotiating parties split the ‘gains from reaching an agreement’, equally among each other. For a discussion
of the application of the Nash Bargaining Solution to various bargaining problems and its relationship with
non-cooperative dynamic solution concepts see Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986).
We will ﬁrst look at the case that prices and access fees are determined sequentially.
•Assumption TC: ‘Transportation cost’ α is high enough to ensure that an equilibrium exists.
3.2.1 A. Sequential-Move Game
We will study the equilibrium choices of prices and access fees, in a game that consists of the following
stages.
28Stage 1: In stage 1 each urban network negotiates access fees with the rural network: (tiR,t Ri),
i = A,B.
Stage 2: (a)The urban networks negotiate over access fees (tA,t B) and (b) given the access fees choose
their prices (pA,p B).
Stage 3: The rural network decides whether to operate or not and sets its price, pR.
Stage 4: Consumption takes place.
We derive a subgame perfect equilibrium of the game. We will assume that the urban networks are
symmetric, that is co
A = co
B = co,c T
A = cT
B = cT and cF
A = cF
B = cF and we will restrict attention
to symmetric equilibria.11 At a symmetric equilibrium it holds that tA = tB = t and pA = pB = p,
tAR = tBR = tUR and tRA = tRB = tRU. Reciprocal access fees between relatively homogeneous networks,
like network A and B in our model, are indeed encouraged by many governments, see Carter and Wright
(1999), Laﬀont et al. (1998a).
• Stage 3: The rural network chooses a price.
In order to derive the subgame perfect equilibrium of this game, one has to specify what price a network
will choose after each history of the game. In other words, for the subgame starting at stage 3, a network’s
strategy has to describe a price choice for each contingency. We need to specify the price that a network
will choose for the case that networks i and j reach an agreement as well as for the case that negotiations
between i and j fail, where i,j = A,B,R and i 6= j.
Suppose that all networks have signed interconnection agreements. Then, given the vector of negotiated
fees (tRU,t UR,t), and the price chosen by the urban networks p, the rural network chooses the price that
maximizes its proﬁts. At a symmetric equilibrium the rural network’s proﬁts are given by














Assuming an interior solution, the ﬁrst order conditions for proﬁt maximization are given by
∂ΠR
∂pR
= γ(a − 2pR + co
R − cT
R)+γ(1 − rR)(tUR− cT
R)=0
11Asymmetric equilibria can be interesting in this model. I have computed examples (preliminary results) that show that
there are equilibria, where one of the urban networks reaches such an agreement with the rural network that makes it
unproﬁtable for the other network to reach an interconnection agreement with the rural market. The agreement is so favorable
to the rural network that the competitor does not ﬁnd proﬁt a b l et om u c hi t .T h ec o a l i t i o no fas i n g l eu r b a nn e t w o r ka n dt h e









Using this straightforward procedure one can determine the price that the urban network will charge in
diﬀerent histories, when for instance negotiations between R and A fail.
• Stage 2: Urban Networks Choose Access Fees and Prices
Suppose that the urban networks have agreed on a reciprocal access fee t and the negotiations with the
rural network have already taken place. Given t and (tUR,t RU), we derive a symmetric equilibrium of the









This is A0s net revenue from selling access to R. Assume an interior solution. If pA is a proﬁt maximizing



















Access Fees: From the analysis in Armstrong (1998), Carter and Wright (1999) and Laﬀont, Rey and
Tirole (1998a) we know that if an equilibrium exists, and access fees are required to be reciprocal, then
in a deregulated duopoly market, networks will choose access fees that support prices that maximize joint
proﬁts. In our environment, where the urban networks are interconnected with the rural network, they
will choose access fees that support the price that maximizes joint proﬁt.
Joint proﬁt for networks A and B are given by
ΠA+B(p)=π(p)+RAR(pR,p)







The price that maximizes joint proﬁts is given by
p =
a + co + cT +( 1− rU)(tRU − cT)
2
. (20)
30From (19) we get that the access fee that sustains joint proﬁt maximization is given by12




• Stage 1: Negotiations between urban networks & rural networks over (tUR,t RU).
Now, we turn on the analysis of the negotiations between an urban network, say network A, and the
rural network. From the analysis of stage 2, we know that if network A is interconnected with network B





and in case network A disagrees with the rural network, its proﬁts will be given by
ΠDAR
A = s1rUπ(pDAR
A )+s1(1 − s1)rU[(t − c)q(pB) − (t − c)q(pDAR
A )],
where s1 denotes the market share of network A in case it disagrees with network R, and is given by
(11). Also pDAR
A stands for the price the rural network will charge network A in the case that negotiations
between A and R collapse, (analytical expression of the optimal price in case of disagreement is very
diﬃcult to obtain). The agreement proﬁts of the rural network are given by (18) and the disagreement
payoﬀsa r eg i v e nb y
ΠDAR




(1 − rU)(tRU − c)(a − p) − (1 − rR)(tUR− c)γ(a − pDAR
R )
¤










As discussed earlier we use the Nash Bargaining Solution to obtain the outcome on negotiations between
network A and the rural network. The solution is a pair (tRA,t AR) that maximizes
(tAR,t RA) ∈ argmax(ΠA − ΠDAR
A )(ΠR − ΠDAR
R ).
Since we are looking at a symmetric equilibrium negotiations, between R and B are identical to the
negotiations between R and A.
We proceed by solving for the symmetric equilibrium of a parametrized example.
12Carter and Wright (1999) present an example where the access fee that sustains a price that maximizes joins proﬁts, is
equal to the one we would get if we used the Nash Bargaining Solution.
31Table 2: Sequential-Moves: Symmetric Equilibrium: A
cF
R =9 ,r R =0 .5,
rU= 0.2
cF
R =9 ,r R =0 .5,
rU= 0.6

















tRA = tRB 3.2645 3.3771
tAR = tBR −1.5672 −0.6431
cF















co = cT =1 ,c F =0 ,c o
R = cT
R =2
γ =0 .5,α =5 0
As noted earlier we solve for a symmetric equilibrium, and we do not impose any cross market price
restrictions.
Discussion of the Results
Table 2 contains the equilibrium prices, access fees and proﬁts that accrue to the three networks as we
increase rU. Recall that rU denotes the fraction of total calls made by urban customers that are completed
within the urban market. As rU increases, the less value the urban customers place in being interconnected
with the rural market. The equilibrium proﬁts of the rural network decrease as rU increases. Later we will
verify analytically that this is also the case in alternative scenarios regarding the degree of competition
in the urban market. In the above example the proﬁts that would accrue to the rural network if it were
not interconnected with the urban market, are given by πR = −4.5, when cF
R =9and πR = −0.5, when















































R =5 . With interconnection the rural network’s proﬁts for ﬁxed cost cF
R =9can be ΠR =1 .7 compared
to πR = −4.5 without interconnection, (see the results in Table 2). Table 3.3 shows how the equilibrium
prices, access fees and proﬁts change as the ﬁxed cost of the rural network falls from cF
R =9to cF
R =5 .
Another interesting feature of the equilibrium, is that the access fee that the rural network pays to an
urban network, whenever a rural customer places a call to an urban customer, tUR,U= A,B, is negative.
The urban network ﬁnds proﬁtable to subsidize the rural network. The reason is that by reaching this
agreement the urban network increases its revenues because urban customers want to place phone calls to
the rural customers. These subsidies lead to access revenues for the rural network that may be high enough
to cover the losses in the retail sector. In particular, observe that ceteris paribus, the subsidy decreases
with rU, (see Table 2). That is, the subsidies decrease as the percentage of phone calls that are completed
within the urban market increases. If urban consumers like to call customers in the same geographic area,
then the urban network does not value interconnection to the rural network as much as it would if urban
customers tended to place a higher percentage of their total demand towards the rural market. Notice also
that prices in the urban and the rural market do not diﬀer substantially and there are sometimes even
lower in the rural market.
333.2.2 B. Simultaneous-Moves
We assume an interior solution and derive the ﬁrst order conditions that optimal prices must satisfy. Taking




Simultaneously with choosing prices, networks negotiate pairwise in order to determine interconnection
access fees. In particular, network A negotiates with network B over tA and tB, and network R negotiates
with A and B over the determination of tAR,t RA and tBR and tRB. All negotiations take place simultane-
ously and independently from one another, in other words, we assume that the outcome of the negotiations
between R and A is not known to R and B when they bargain over (tBR,t RB).
• Negotiations between A and B over (tA,t B)
As noted earlier we will use the Nash Bargaining solution in order to determine the outcome of nego-
tiations between A and B. The Nash Solution to this bargaining situation is a pair (tA,t B) such that
(tA,t B) ∈ argmax(ΠA − ΠDAB
A )(ΠB − ΠDAB
B ), (22)
where ΠA and ΠB are given by (15) and (16) respectively. The disagreement payoﬀso fn e t w o r kA are
given by
ΠDAB















where s1 is given by (11). Similarly the disagreement payoﬀso fn e t w o r kB are given by
ΠDAB
















The ﬁrst order conditions of the problem described in (22) reduce to
ΠA − ΠDAB
A − ΠB + ΠDAB
B =0 . (23)
• Negotiations between U and R over (tUR,t RU),U= A,B
Networks A and R bargain over the determination of (tAR,t RA). Again, we use the Nash Solution to
determine the outcome of these negotiations. Hence
(tAR,t RA) ∈ argmax(ΠA − ΠDAR
A )(ΠR − ΠDAR
R ), (NAB)
34where ΠA and ΠR are described in (15) and in (17), and
ΠDAR






























where s2 is given by (13). The ﬁrst order conditions reduce to
ΠA − ΠDAR
A − ΠR + ΠDAR
R =0 . (NAR)
Similarly we can describe negotiations between network B and network R.
• Suﬃcient Conditions
Substituting (pi),i= A,B,R into (NAB), (NAR)a n d(NBR), form a system of 3 equations in 6
unknowns, (tA,t B,t AR,t RA,t BR,t RB).F o rﬁxed tRA,t RB and tB it is possible to solve for tAR,t BRand tA
as a function of tRA,t RB and tB. The solution is unique and stable provided that the following matrix of


























We solve for a symmetric equilibrium of the simultaneous move game. At a symmetric equilibrium both
sides of (23) are zero, so tA and tB become indeterminate. We assume that tA = tB = cT and tRA = tRA =
cT
R. In other words, we look at a scenario where the urban networks set a reciprocal access fee equal to the
cost of terminating a phone call and the access fee that the rural network charges to a urban network is
equal to each termination cost. We determine the prices that each network charges, as well as the access
fee that the rural network pays to the urban network.
Example 1 Suppose that
q(p)=1 0− p
co = cT =1 ,c F =0
co
R = cT
R =2 ,γ=0 .5,α =5 0
The results are qualitatively the same with the ones obtained in the sequential move game.
35Table 4: Simultaneous-Move Game: Symmetric Equilibrium (cF









pA = pB 6.1266 6.1406 5.7440 5.4186
pR 5.5429 5.4065 5.8932 6.3592
tA = tB 1111
tRA = tRB 2222
tAR = tBR −7.7137 −4.3739 −2.4274 −0.5634
ΠA = ΠB 3.5298 3.3608 5.3566 6.8904
ΠR 0.9327 −0.4032 −0.5669 −2.3721
ΠDUR
R −1.1906 −0.3557 −1.4895 −2.3626
ΠDUR
U 1.4065 1.4076 4.4340 6.9000
Table 5: Simultaneous-Move Game: Symmetric Equilibrium (cF









pA = pB 5.9083 5.6983
pR 5.8864 6.1020
tA = tB 11
tRA = tRB 22
tAR = tBR −5.4241 −1.5922
ΠA = ΠB 4.7863 5.8311
ΠR 3.4609 2.5974
ΠDUR
R ,U= A,B 1.5516 1.1857
ΠDUR
U ,U= A,B 2.8770 4.4194
364C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
In this paper we investigate whether provision of universal service is sustainable without outside subsi-
dies. We have extended the standard model of two competing interconnected networks, by including a
third network that operates in a separate, high cost market, and have shown that in many instances in-
terconnection will ensure universal service without government intervention or expensive subsidies. This
is a simple, but an important insight, considering that the US government estimates that the amount of
subsidies necessary to support universal service amounts to $5 billion per year.13 Our results demonstrate
that if urban customers place a large enough fraction of their total demand for calls to rural customers,
then the rural network generates revenue from selling access that is high enough to cover its losses from
providing telecommunication services. If this is the case in some markets, then there is no need to arrange
for outside subsidies, since the market is viable on its own. Depending on the market power in the urban
market there are diﬀerent mechanisms in place that work in favor of cross-subsidization. Higher market
power means higher proﬁts that could be split across markets, but also means higher bargaining power
vis-a-vis the rural network, whereas low market power implies very low proﬁts in the urban market but
at the same time, very weak position in the negotiations. A weakness of the current analysis is that our
results are completely silent to whether prices will be comparable across markets. In the future we plan to
investigate the eﬀect of cross-market price constraints, similar to the ones in [1], on the negotiated access
fees and on the equilibrium proﬁts.
5A p p e n d i x
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 .
The ﬁrst order conditions of the above maximization problem reduce to
ΠA − ΠD
A = ΠR − ΠD
R. (24)
ΠA − ΠD
A =( v − cT
A)+( 1− rR)tARγ − (1 − rU)tRA − [γ(1 − rR) − (1 − rU)]cT
A − rU(v − cT
A)
=( 1 − rU)(v − cT
A)+( 1− rR)tARγ − (1 − rU)tRA − [γ(1 − rR) − (1 − rU)]cT
A
=( 1 − rU)(v − cT
A) − RAR − [γ(1 − rR) − (1 − rU)]cT
A (25)
13What Price Universal Service?: Impact of Deleveraging Nationwide Urban/Rural Rates, Telecommunications Industries
Analysis Project, Cambridge, MA., 1993.
37ΠR − ΠD
R = γ(v − cT
R) − cF
R − (1 − rR)tARγ +( 1− rU)tRA +[ γ(1 − rR) − (1 − rU)]cT
R − γrR(v − cT
R) − cF
R
=( 1 − rR)γ(v − cT
R) − cF
R − (1 − rR)tARγ +( 1− rU)tRA +[ γ(1 − rR) − (1 − rU)]cT
R
=( 1 − rR)γ(v − cT
R)+RAR +[ γ(1 − rR) − (1 − rU)]cT
R (26)
Combining (24), (25), and (26) we obtain
(1 − rU)(v − cT
A) − RAR − [γ(1 − rR) − (1 − rU)]cT
A =( 1 − rR)γ(v − cT
R)+RAR +[ γ(1 − rR) − (1 − rU)]cT
R
2RAR =( 1 − rU)(v − cT
A) − (1 − rR)γ(v − cT
R)
−[γ(1 − rR) − (1 − rU)]cT
A − [γ(1 − rR) − (1 − rU)]cT
R
2RAR =[ ( 1 − rU) − (1 − rR)γ]v − cT
A [(1 − rU)+γ(1 − rR) − (1 − rU)]
−cT
R [−(1 − rR)γ + γ(1 − rR) − (1 − rU)]











P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 .
Recall that
ΠR = γ(v − cT
R) − cF
R + RAR +[ γ(1 − rR) − (1 − rU)]cT
R,
then by substituting in RAR we get








+[γ(1 − rR) − (1 − rU)]cT
R − cF
R
=( 0 .5((1 − rU) − (1 − rR)γ)+γ)v − 0.5γ(1 − rR)cT
A
+[γ(1 − rR) − γ − (1 − rU)+0 .5(1 − rU)]cT
R − cF
R
ΠR =( 0 .5(1 − rU) − 0.5(1− rR)γ + γ)v − 0.5γ(1 − rR)cT
A
+[γ(1 − rR) − γ − (1 − rU)+0 .5(1 − rU)]cT
R − cF
R
=( 0 .5((1 − rU)+0 .5rRγ +0 .5γ))v − 0.5γ(1 − rR)cT
A − [rRγ +0 .5(1 − rU)]cT
R − cF
R
=( 0 .5((1 − rU)+0 .5(1 + rR)γ))v − 0.5γ(1 − rR)cT
A − [rRγ +0 .5(1 − rU)]cT
R − cF
R
Similarly by substituting in RAR in ΠA we get
38ΠA =( v − cT
A) − 0.5
£




−[γ(1 − rR) − (1 − rU)]cT
A
=[ 1 − 0.5((1 − rU) − (1 − rR)γ)]v − cT
A [γ(1 − rR) − (1 − rU)+1− 0.5γ(1 − rR)]
−0.5cT
R(1 − rU)
=[ 0 .5(1 + rU)+( 1− rR)γ]v − cT
A [0.5γ(1 − rR)+rU] − 0.5cT
R(1 − rU)
Summary:
ΠA =[ 0 .5(1 + rU)+( 1− rR)γ]v − cT
A [0.5γ(1 − rR)+rU] − 0.5cT
R(1 − rU)
ΠR =( 0 .5((1− rU)+0 .5(1 + rR)γ))v − 0.5γ(1 − rR)cT
A − [rRγ +0 .5(1 − rU)]cT
R − cF
R,
which can be rewritten as
ΠR =0 .5γ(1 + rR)(v − cT
R)+0 .5(1 − rU)(v − cT
A) − cF
R




ΠA =0 .5(1 + rU)(v − cT
A)+0 .5γ(1 − rR)(v − cT
R)




[1] Anton, J., J.H. Vander Weide and N. Vettas. (2002): “Entry Auctions and Strategic Behavior under
Cross-Market Price Constraints,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol.20 (5), p. 611-
629.
[2] Armstrong, M. (1998): “Network Interconnection in Telecommunications,” Economic Journal, 108,
p. 545-564.
[3] Armstrong, M. (2001):“Access Pricing, Bypass and Universal Service,” American Economic Review,
91 (2), 297-301.
[4] Armstrong, M. (2002):“The Theory of Access Pricing and Interconnection,” Handbook of Telecommu-
nication Economics (North Holland), edited by Martin Cave, Sumit Majumdar and Ingo Voglesang.
39[5] Armstrong, M., C. Doyle and J. Vickers. (1996): “The Access Pricing Problem: A Synthesis,” The
Journal of Industrial Economics, 44, p. 131-150.
[6] Armstrong, M. and D. Sappington (2004): “Recent Developmentas in the Theory of Regulation,”
forthcoming in The Handbook of Industrial Organization, edited by M. Armstrong and R. Porter,
Elsevier Science Publishers.
[7] Baumol, W. (1999): “Having Your Cake: How to Preserve Universal-Service Cross Subsidies While
Facilitating Competitive Entry,” Yale Journal of Regulation, 16(1), p. 1-18.
[8] Binmore, Ken, Ariel Rubinstein and Asher Wolinsky. (1986) “The Nash Bargaining Solution in Eco-
nomic Modelling,” Rand Journal of Economics, 17, 176-188.
[9] Carter, M. and J. Wright (1999): “Interconnection in Network Industries,” Review of Industrial Or-
ganization, 14:1-25.
[10] Carter, M. and J. Wright (2000): “Bargaining over Interconnection: The Clear-Telecom Dispute,”
Working Paper, Center for research in Network Economics and Communications, University of Auck-
land.
[11] Carter, M and J. Wright (2003): “Asymmetric Network Interconnection,” Review of Industrial Orga-
nization, 22, 27-46.
[12] Dana, J., and K. Spier. (1994): “Designing a Private Industry: Government Auctions with Endogenous
Market Structure,” Journal of Public Economics, 53, p. 127-147.
[13] Doganoglou, T. and Y. Tauman. (1999): “Network Competition and Access Charge Rules”, Mimeo,
SUNY at Stony Brook.
[14] Economides, N., Lopomo, G. and G. Woroch (1996): “Strategic Commitments and the Principle of
Reciprocity in Interconnection Pricing,” Discussion Paper No. EC-96-13. Stern School of Business,
New York University.
[15] European Commission. (1997): Universal Service for Telecommunications in the Perspective of a
Fully Liberalized Environment, hhtp://europa.eu.int/ISPO?infosoc/legreg/9673.html.
[16] Federal Communications Commission. Report to Congress, April 10, 1998.
[17] Gal-Or. E. (1999): “Transition to Competition in Local Telephone Markets”, Mimeo, University of
Pittsburgh.
40[18] Jeon, D.-S., J.-J. Laﬀont, and J. Tirole (2004): “On the Receiver Pays Principle,” Rand Journal of
Economics, Winter 2004.
[19] Laﬀont, J.-J, S. Marcus, P. Rey and J. Tirole (2003): “Internet Interconnection and the Oﬀ-net-cost
Pricing Principle,” Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 34, No. 2, p. 370-390.
[20] Laﬀont, J.-J. and J. Tirole (2000): Competition in Telecommunications. The MIT Press, Cambridge,
MA.
[21] Laﬀont, J.-J., P. Rey and Jean Tirole, (1998a): “Network Competition: I. Overview and Nondiscrim-
inatory Pricing,” Rand Journal of Economics, 29, p. 1-37.
[22] Laﬀont, J.-J., P. Rey and Jean Tirole, (1998b): “Network Competition: II. Price Discrimination,”
Rand Journal of Economics, 29, p. 38-56.
[23] Maher, M., (1999): “Access costs and entry in the local telecommunications network: a case for
de-averaged rates,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 17, p. 593-609.
[24] Milgrom, P. (1996): “Procuring Universal Service: Putting Auction Theory to Work” Lecture at the
Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, December 9.
[25] Oftel (1997). The Funding of Universal Service. http//www.oftel.gov.uk?cpnsumer/univers2/chap7.htm.
[26] Riordan, M. (2000): “An Economist’s Perspective on Residential Universal Service,” The Internet
Upheaval: Raising Questions, Seeking Answers in Communications Policy, MIT Press, edited by Ingo
Vogelsang and Benjamin M. Compaine.
[27] Riordan, M. (2002): “Universal Residential Telephone Service,” Handbook of Telecommunication Eco-
nomics (North Holland), edited by Martin Cave, Sumit Majumdar and Ingo Voglesang.
[28] Rosston, G. and B. Wimmer (2000): “From C to Shinning C: Competition and Cross-Subsidy in
Communications," Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, Discussion Paper , 00-21.
[29] Weller, D. (1998): “Auctions for Universal Service,” Presented at the twentieth bienneial conference
of the ITS, Stockholm, June 1998.
41